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STOP! IN THE NAME OF ETHICS, BEFORE You BREAK MY BANK
ACCOUNT: THE "CONFLICTING" RIGHTS GUARANTEED TO
PARTIES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION BY
HRVATSKA V. SLOVENIA AND ROMPETROL V. ROMANIA,
AND THEIR POTENTIAL AS TACTICAL WEAPONS

Misbah Farid
ABSTRACT

International arbitration offers many rights, such as the right to
counsel of choice and the right to an independent and impartial
arbitration panel and proceeding. However, these guarantees, while
they ensure the rights of parties and allow international arbitration to
be a viable dispute resolution forum, can also be used as weapons.
The viability of these rights as weapons is what reconciles the
seemingly conflicting cases of Hrvatska v. Slovenia and Rompetrol v.
Romania. Hrvatska sets forth an arbitration tribunal's inherent right to
ensure and regulate the proceedings so as to guarantee the rights
offered by international arbitration, while Rompetrol limits the
arbitration tribunal's inherent powers to ensure and guarantee these
rights. This article seeks to argue that, while the limitation of the
rights in Hrvatska by the Rompetrol Tribunal is an implicit recognition
of the viability of those rights as weapons and, in turn, a need for an
international code of ethics, such a pursuit may prove fruitless.
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INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE

"International arbitration dwells in an ethical no-man's
land."1 This is how Doak Bishop started his Keynote Speech to the
International Council for International Arbitration on the need for an
international ethics code. 2 By reminding the audience of the
questionable extraterritorial effect of national ethical codes, the nonexistence of a supra-national authority to oversee attorney conduct,
and the lack of established ethical norms in international arbitration,
Bishop laid the foundation for his thesis on why there should be
ethical regulations.3
This paper seeks to further Doak Bishop's argument, and
expand upon and analyze a later scholarly article by Jeff Waincymer,
by warning of the double-edged sword nature of both the rights and
limits to a party's choice of legal counsel in an international tribunal.
Instead of strictly citing to the insufficiency of present codes as a
reason for the establishment of an international code of ethics, this
paper will seek to highlight the ramifications of the rights and
limitations that were recently solidified by Hrvatska v. Slovenia4 and
Rompetrol v. Romania, and then will seek to query the fruitfulness of a
binding international code of ethics.5
II. THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
In arbitration, a dispute is submitted to the decision or award
of an impartial third party for a binding settlement. 6 While one may
think that arbitration came about as a reaction to judicial settlement,
Doak Bishop, Keynote Speech at the International Council for Commercial
Arbitration: Ethics in International Arbitration at 1 (Jun. 11, 2010) (transcript
available at http://www.arbitration-icca.org/media/0/12763302233510/icca rio
keynotespeech.pdf.).
2 Id.
3

id.

4 Hrvatska Elektroprivreda v.

Republic of Slovenia, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/24, 24
ICSID Review - FILJ 201 (2009).
The Rompetrol Group NV v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/3, 24 ICSID
Review - FILJ 232 (2009).

History of the International Court of Justice, International Court of Justice,
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/court/index.php?pl=1&p2=1.
6
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arbitration actually preceded judicial settlement in history.7 Examples
of it are found in ancient Greece and China, medieval Europe, and in
Papal practice.8 The modern history of international arbitration dates
to the Jay Treaty of 1794 between the United States of America and
Great Britain, which created mixed commissions as a dispute
resolution mechanism.9 These commissions have slowly grown into
what today is the field of arbitration.1 0
A.

The Advantages of InternationalArbitration

International arbitration offers many advantages to parties
seeking to resolve their disputes in an alternative dispute resolution
forum." Parties can avoid the uncertainty associated with national
courts while tailoring arbitral procedures to the individual case. 12 A
"neutral" forum may then furnish a binding decision, which will be
enforceable in most states.1 3 The primary instrument governing the
enforcement of commercial international arbitration awards is the
United Nations Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1958 (the "New York Convention"),
which was drafted under the auspices of the United Nations.14 An
international award originating in a signatory state will be enforced
by any other signatory state.' 5 This Convention has over 120, or most,
member states as signatories.16 An international award therefore has
substantially greater force than an award from a domestic court.' 7

7 id.
8 Id.
9 Id.

0 Id; see also Carla S. Copeland, The Use of Arbitration To Settle Territorial
Disputes, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 3073 (1999).
'See Kathryn Helne Nickerson, International Arbitration. March 2005. Available at

http://www.osec.doc.gov/ogc/occic/arb-98.html.

id
" Id.
14 id
12

'5

Id.

16 See

17id.

Kathryn Helne Nickerson, supra note 11.

"CONFLICTING" RIGHTS

2013
B.

167

The Disadvantagesof InternationalArbitration

The only disadvantage of international arbitration that is
relevant for the purposes of this paper is related to the advantages of
international arbitration. International arbitration, much like any
other viable dispute resolution forum, grants a host of rights to the
parties to a dispute. However, shrewd counsel can, and have, utilized
those very rights as weapons as against opposing counsel to delay
proceedings and undercut what may otherwise have been a winning
argument.
III. INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: A VIABLE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION FORUM BECAUSE OF THE RIGHTS IT GUARANTEES

International commercial arbitration, an increasingly common forum to resolve disputes, offers a number of fundamental
rights to parties in a dispute.1 8 One such fundamental right is the
right of a disputant to an adequate opportunity to present its case.19
That right extends to a party's right to choose counsel of its choice in
order to do So. 2 0
A seemingly non-conflicting right also offered to disputants
in international commercial arbitration is the right to have one's
dispute decided by an arbitration tribunal that is independent and
impartial throughout the duration of the arbitration proceedings. 21
Thus, not only do disputants in international commercial arbitration
proceedings have the right to adequately present their cases, they
must be guaranteed the right to present their cases to an independent
and impartial tribunal. 22 In order to ensure that the tribunal is
independent and impartial, it has been argued that the tribunal must

Hrvatska, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/24, 24 ICSID Review - FILJ 201 15, 30;
Jeff Waincymer, Reconciling Conflicting Rights in InternationalArbitration: The
Right to Choice of Counsel and the Right to an Independent and ImpartialTribunal,
26 Arb. Int'1 597, 598 (2010).
19Rompetrol, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/3, 24 ICSID Review - FILJ 201
21; see
also Waincymer, supra note 18, at 598.
20 Waincymer, supra note
18, at 598.
21 Id.
22 Id.
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not only ensure that it is not biased, but also that it does not even
give off an appearance of bias. 23

A. Firstin Time: An Analysis of the Rights Guaranteedby
InternationalArbitration
Typically, parties will first select counsels to represent
themselves and then nominate an arbitrator of their own choice to sit
on the arbitrator panel. 24 This procedure makes it so challenges to
arbitrators, and not the initially chosen counsel, are the norm. 25 This
article, however, will look to cases where a challenge to a party's
right to choose its own counsel was more appropriate than a
challenge to an already properly constituted, immutable tribunal. 26 In
these cases, an arbitration panel was already set up when new
counsel, who caused either actual or an appearance of bias, were later
added. This set-up will allow for a closer analysis of a party's right to
counsel while other rights that international arbitration guarantees
are kept constant.27 This in no way suggests that a tribunal cannot be
challenged if counsel is added later; this analysis is limited to the
alternative choice of barring a counsel after an arbitration panel is

already properly constituted.
IV. CASE ANALYSIS: GUARANTEEING RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, ONE DISPUTE AT A TIME

Two recently published cases from the International Centre
for Settlement of Investment Disputes located in Washington, D.C.,
specifically address counsel conduct and, implicitly, a party's right to
choose its representation. 28 Both of these cases were governed by
international treaty - The International Centre for Settlement

23 Id.;

see also Hrvatska, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/24, 24 ICSID Review - FILJ at

208 T 15.

Waincymer, supra note 18, at 598.
Id at 598-99.
26 Id.
24
25

2 Id.
28 Bishop,

supra note 1, at 4.
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Investment Disputes Convention-and involved the application of
international law.29
A. Hrvatska v. Slovenia: When Chambermen Go Wrong
In the first case, Hrvatska v. Slovenia, the Claimant asked the
Tribunal to "recommend to the Respondent that it refrain from using
the services of a British barrister who belonged to the same Chambers
as the President of the Tribunal."3 0 The barrister was added after the
case began; his involvement was disclosed only shortly before the
final hearing. 1 While the Tribunal recognized that there was no
explicit authority to allow a tribunal to remove a counsel and that
there was a fundamental principle that parties may use the lawyers
of their choice, the Tribunal went on to say that a party's right to
counsel of its choice was subject to override by the immutability of
properly-constituted tribunals. 32 The Tribunal went on to find that it
had an inherent power to take measures to preserve the integrity of
the proceedings. In this instance, a party compromised the integrity
of the proceedings by amending its legal team after the constitution
of the Tribunal; the Tribunal was permitted to cure the issue. The
Tribunal qualified its holding by saying that there was no "hard and
fast rule" preventing barristers from the same Chambers as acting as
arbitrator and counsel in the same case.3 3
It should be noted that the arbitrator and counsel in this case
had no personal relationship; their professional relationship strictly
flowed from their membership to the same Chambers.3 4 Furthermore,
the arbitrator previously arbitrated numerous arbitrations where one
of the parties was represented by counsel from the same chambers,
but there was no challenge to his or the Tribunal's independence or

29 Id.
30

Id; see also Hrvatska, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/24, 24 ICSID Review - FILJ at

207

10.

Id at T 21; see also Bishop, supra note 1, at 4; Waincymer, supra note 18, at 599600.
32 Hrvatska, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/24, 24 ICSID Review
- FILJ at 211 25-28;
see also Bishop, supra note 1, at 5.
33 Hrvatska, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/24, 24 ICSID Review - FILJ at 212
31.
34
id. 5..
31
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impartiality. Nevertheless, this Tribunal found that the arbitration
proceedings could not go on without a change. Pray tell, why?
Important factors in this case which may have had a
substantive impact on the Tribunal's decision included the
Respondent's refusal to disclose when Respondent had retained its
counsel, or the specific role the individual in question was to play on
its legal team. 35 It was later conceded by the Respondent that it could
have made an earlier disclosure about its questionable addition to its
legal team.36
Thus, perhaps the Tribunal was pushed over the edge by the
Respondent's uncooperative behavior.37 Perhaps it was Respondent's
dodgy, secretive behavior aimed at disadvantaging Claimant.
Regardless of the underlying factors, the Tribunal in Hrvatska chose
to remove counsel on the sole basis of a distant, seemingly harmless
professional relationship3 8 with an arbitrator in the face of absolutely
no express provision allowing it to do so.39
In making its ruling, the tribunal in Hrvatska cited to40 the
applicable ICSID Rules. 41 Rule 18(1)42 requires disclosure of the
identity of counsel, which Respondent was in clear violation of. 43 But
that was not the rule which gave this tribunal the primary
substantive support for its finding of an inherent authority to remove

35
36

Waincymer, supra note 18, at 600.
Id.

3
3

Id.

39

Id at 600.

The Tribunal took a close look at the concept of a "Chamber" and what belonging
to a Chamber meant. The Tribunal followed the guidance set forth in the IBA
Guidelines by likening a membership to the same "chamber" to belonging to the
same firm. Id. at 601-02.
While the cases analyzed by this paper were decided under ICSID provisions, the
author of this paper assumes the (sometimes inarguable) wide applicability of the
ICSID guarantees mentioned here as central to most, if not all, dispute resolution
40

forums.
41 Waincymer, supra note 18, at 600.
42
Rule 18(1) of the ICSID provisions is as follows: "Each party may be represented
or assisted by agents, counsel or advocates whose names and authority shall be
notified by that party to the Secretary-General, who shall promptly inform the
Tribunal and the other party." See, Rules of Procedurefor Arbitration Proceedings,
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, Rule 18.
43 Waincymer, supra note 18, at 600.
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a counsel who tainted the impartiality or independence of an
arbitration proceeding. 44 Instead, the Tribunal chose to cite to the
ever-elusive Rule 19,45 common in many arbitration rules, allowing
the Tribunal to "make the orders required for the conduct of the
proceeding," 46 to bolster its claim of a newly founded inherent
power. 47
This rule is the be-all and end-all of procedural arbitration
rules. Shrewd counsel can utilize this rule quite quickly to their
advantage, coercing the Tribunal into a ruling that it had never been
promulgated to make.48 However, it would be silly to strictly utilize
the "inherent power" of the Tribunal by itself as a weapon when it
can be donned whilst being supported by a written, broad, but
codified rule that essentially forces a tribunal to ensure the adequacy
of a proceeding. Hence, the Tribunal bolstered its ruling by hiding
under the cloak of its responsibility to "ensure that the [a]ward is
soundly based and not affected by procedural imperfection." 49
So what happened to Respondent's right to counsel of its
choice? Here, it was a war between Respondent's right to counsel of
its choice and Claimant's right to challenge the award, if even the
impermissible appearance of partiality existed. The Tribunal knew it
could fight Respondent's right to counsel of its choice with the unfair
detriment it would have upon Claimant; Claimant's right to

Id.
This rule was used in conjunction with ICSID Arbitration Rule 44, which states,
"If any question of procedure arises which is not covered by this Section or the
Arbitration Rules or any rules agreed by the parties, the Tribunal shall decide the
question." International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, Rules of
Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings, Article 44, Apr. 10, 2006, ICSID/15,
available at http:/iscid. Worldbank.org/iscid/staticfiles/basicdoc/CCR Englishfinal.pdf.
46 Rule 19 of the ICSID provisions is as follows: "The Commission shall make the
orders required for the conduct of the proceeding." International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes, Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings,
Rule 19, Apr. 10, 2006, ICSID/15, available at http:/iscid. Worldbank.org/
iscid/staticfiles/basicdoc/CCR English-final.pdf.
47 Hrvatska, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/24, 24 ICSID Review - FILJ at 201
15.
48 Waincymer, supra note 18, at 600.
49 Hrvatska, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/24, 24 ICSID Review - FILJ at 201 T 15,
33; see also Waincymer, supra note 18, at 600.
44
45
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challenge the award, however, was a weapon that would not be
easily trumped.
Thus, by allowing a Tribunal to remove counsel that tainted
the proceedings, the Tribunal simultaneously qualified the right of a
party to seek representation as it saw fitso particularly where it
would imperil a legitimate tribunal.51
The Tribunal then went through more analysis to establish
why it was permissible, necessary in fact, for an arbitration tribunal
to be vested with the inherent authority to remove counsel, as
opposed to allowing such challenges to automatically go to another
tribunal or commission. The only other option available, which the
Tribunal disqualified, would be to allow individual national bodies
to regulate professional service providers; such discrepancies
between individual national laws would make for greater
inconvenience and questionable stability. 52 Neigh, the Tribunal must
be vested with the inherent power to remove counsel where it saw fit.
This was the decision put forth by Hrvatska v. Slovenia.
B.

Rompetrol v. Romania: ihen a Litigation Tactic Goes Wrong

In Rompetrol v. Romania, the Respondent asked the ICSID
Tribunal to disqualify the counsel for the Claimant who had, like in
Hrvatska, been added after the case began. 53 Here, however,
Claimant's attorney previously practiced at the same law firm as the
arbitrator appointed by the Claimant.5 4 Furthermore, unlike Hrvatska,

It should also be considered that this Tribunal opted to remove Counsel because
Claimant argued that removal of counsel would eliminate any existing problems.
50

Claimant never argued that the involvement of Respondent's counsel tainted
Respondent's case. Perhaps if Claimant argued the latter, the Tribunal would have
considered a challenge to the composition of the Tribunal itself, and not simply one
party's counsel. Waincymer, supra note 18, at 603-04.
5 Id. at 602.
52 Hrvatska, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/24, 24 ICSID Review
- FILJ at 201 T 2; see
also Bishop, supra note 1, at 4.
5 The Rompetrol Group NV v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/3, 24 ICSID
Review - FILJ at 232 233 1-5 (2009); see also Bishop, supra note 1, at 5-7.
54 Rompetrol, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/3, 24 ICSID Review - FILJ at 233-234 T 47.
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the Tribunal was reluctant to endorse any notion of a Tribunal's
inherent power to remove counsel.55
Despite its reluctance to endorse any notion of a Tribunal's
inherent power to remove counsel, the Tribunal noted that where
such a power did exist, it should only be used in rare and compelling
circumstances. 56 This Tribunal's view of the restricted nature of a
Tribunal's inherent right to remove counsel was as a direct result of
the non-existence of any express rule to support its very existence.57
This dicta, however, was unnecessary. The Court did not need any of
these words to conclude that Claimant's counsel did not need to be
removed. Here, the Tribunal found that Claimant's counsel's
presence would not cause the arbitrator to be biased and partial
because his relationship58 with the arbitrator was too far removed.59
Thus, it seems the integrity of the proceedings were not sufficiently
threatened to warrant an invocation of a Tribunal's inherent power to
remove counsel.60
A few interesting facts of this case warrant attention to
understand why the Tribunal did not allow for removal in this case,
and how this case can be further distinguished from, or reconciled
with, Hravtska. In Rompetrol, Claimant's counsel retired from practice
during the proceeding. 61 The Claimant was thus placed into a
compromising position, finding itself in need of new counsel.
However, Claimant did not choose its retired counsel's questionable

56

Id at 238-39
Id at 240-41

22.

25.
Id at 236 16.
58 The issue is specifically whether counsel has an insight into a particular tribunal

member's way of working. It has been argued that this is not the case, but this may
be the crux of the issue. Litigation tactics, much like chess moves, are motivated by
the desire to get an edge over the opponent party. Getting an insight into the decision
maker's head or thought process would be a highly desirable litigation tactic, indeed.
See id at 240 24 ("the question is not whether particular counsel have an insight
into a particular tribunal member's way of working or thinking.").
59 Waincymer, supra note 18, at 604-06.
60 Rompetrol, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/3, 24 ICSID Review - FILJ at 242 27.
61
Id. at 3.
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replacement. 62 The law firm of Claimant's retired counsel, instead,
chose the questionable replacement counsel. 63
First, it was beyond Claimant's control to have to replace its
counsel after the arbitration panel had already been constituted. 64
Second, Claimant's retired counsel's firm chose the replacement, not
Claimant. 65 That the replacement had a conflict of interest with the
arbitrator was beyond the control of Claimant and, in fact, quite
incidental.66 This was not a case where Claimant had misused its
rights as a tool; to the contrary, Claimant was placed in a
compromising position through no ill-intention of its own. 67
While Claimant could have requested another counsel, there
was no need for other counsel by the time of the arbitration
proceedings. Unlike in Hrvatska, the questioned counsel no longer
belonged to the same firm as the arbitrator. 68 Moreover, Claimant
here, cooperated with the Tribunal in disclosing the disputed
counsel's dealings with the Tribunal member during the time
arbitrator and the attorney were at the same firm.
Perhaps it was Claimant's refusal to use its rights as a
weapon against opposing counsel that caused this Tribunal's
reluctance to further any inherent right to remove Counsel. Perhaps it
was this Tribunal's method of recognizing limitations upon rights
guaranteed in arbitration. After all, the party who lost in this case had
perverted its right to present its case fairly and turn it into a weapon
against opposing counsel by challenging counsel's right to be in the
case. Perhaps this Tribunal was correct in questioning Respondent's
intentions when it made a claim to exercise its rights of challenging
counsel.
Another means of distinguishing Rompetrol from Hrvatska
was Rompetrol's failure to recognize any codified support for a
Tribunal's inherent power to regulate its proceedings. Instead,
Rompetrol found that the Hrvatska Tribunal had "award[ed] itself the
62

6
64

Id. at 4.
Id at 3-4.
Id.

65

Rompetrol, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/3, 24 ICSID Review - FILJ at TT 3-4.

66

Id.

67 id.
6

1

d. at 4.
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power by extrapolation." 69 The Rompetrol Tribunal, instead, chose to
emphasize the lack of an express power to remove counsel by saying
that "[tihis silence cannot be accidental, and surely derives from the
fundamentally different duties inherent in the roles of arbitrator and
of counsel."70
However, Rompetrol did not entirely dismiss the findings of
the Hrvatska Tribunal. In making its decision, the Ronipetrol tribunal
noted that Hrvatska was not binding. 71 However, the Rompetrol
Tribunal specifically refused to abrogate the inherent right of a
tribunal to remove counsel by stating that if such a right did exist,
that it ought to be limited to certain situations that "genuinely touch
on the integrity of the arbitral process." The Tribunal then went on to
provide a gauge for what situations would "genuinely touch on the
integrity of the arbitral process". The Rompetrol Tribunal suggested
one test would consider "whether [a] fair-minded and informed
observer, having considered the facts, would conclude that there was
a real possibility that the tribunal was biased," 72 or, "if a reasonable
and informed third party would reach the conclusion that there was a
likelihood that the arbitrator may be influenced by factors other than
the merits of the case as presented by the parties in reaching his or
her decision." 73
Another interesting aspect to the Rompetrol case was the
Tribunal's note that counsel is not required to be impartial; only an
arbitrator bears this requirement.74 While this is correct, an arbitrator
can fail to maintain the required impartiality because of the

'Id. at 16.
70

Rompetrol, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/3, 24 ICSID Review - FILJ at 19.

71 Id. at
15.
72 This test was

originally set forth in the UK House of Lords decision of Porter v.
Magill. While this case was not binding upon this Tribunal, it is apparent that the
Tribunal found it quite persuasive. Porter v. Magill [2002] 2 WLR 37, per Lord
Hope; see also, general standard 2(c) in the IBA Guidelines ([I]f a reasonable and
informed third party would reach the conclusion that there was a likelihood that the
arbitrator may be influenced by factors other than the merits of the case as presented
by the parties in reaching his or her decision.); Waincymer, supra note 18, at 606.
73 IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration, General
Standard 2(c), 22 May 2004, Council of International Bar Association
74
Rompetrol, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/3, 24 ICSID Review - FILJ at 7 19.
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relationship between counsel and the tribunal. 75 Furthermore,
Respondent's challenge to Claimant's counsel was in regards to the
relationship between counsel and arbitrator, which would be
impugned upon the arbitrator; it was not to the Claimant's counsel's
impartiality. Perhaps Respondent utilized the wrong tool here;
perhaps Respondent should have directly challenged the Arbitrator.
But where the panel was already properly constituted, and where
such a challenge would likely be unsuccessful, Respondent may have
thought twice before facing the alternative of going through a
proceeding with an arbitrator that it had unsuccessfully accused of
bias.
The Tribunal went on to address the tension between a
party's right to counsel of its choice and the right to an independent
and impartial tribunal. 76 The Tribunal immediately dismissed any
notion of reconciling the two, noting that if the two came into
collision, then the tribunal would have to find a way to bring them
into balance and not assign priority over the other.77 The Tribunal's
note on "the [T]ribunal's duty" to bring rights into balance can,
however, be easily utilized to argue that the Tribunal impliedly
accepted some inherent or implied power to remove counsel,
particularly in light of the Tribunal's confirmation of its inherent
power to preserve the integrity and effectiveness of the Tribunal
proceedings.78
While repeatedly warning that there were no express
provisions to allow removal of counsel, the Tribunal nevertheless
went on to consider the use and effects of a tribunal's inherent power
to remove counsel. Ronpetrol warned of the difficulty of effectively
controlling counsel's involvement, noting how difficult it would be to
make sure that the removed counsel did not provide any assistance. 79
The two cases mentioned may have come out in two different
directions, making it seem as if Rompetrol invalidated the earlier
decision. However, the Rom petrol Tribunal was quick to make sure
that the decision it set forth would not be utilized as a weapon
75
76

Waincymer, supra note 18, at 606.

Rompetrol, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/3, 24 ICSID Review - FILJ at 9

77 Id.
78Id.
79

Id. at 24.

T 21-22.
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against those who wished to cite to Hrvatska. 80 The Rompetrol
Tribunal dismissed the idea that its decision and reasoning made it
seem that the Hrvatska Tribunal was inadequate or insufficient. 8'
After the Rompetrol Tribunal dismissed the idea that it was rejecting
the Hrvatska Tribunal's decision, it went on to try to distinguish the
two cases by pointing out the secondary role that would be given to
the newly appointed counsel, the request that removing counsel
would cure all issues, and the late announcement and disclosure of
the new appointment of counsel. 82
V. THE RIGHTS GUARANTEED TO PARTIES IN AN INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION: RIGHTS IN THE RIGHT HANDS, WEAPONS IN THE
WRONG HANDS

What follows are examples of how shrewd counsel can use
the rights mentioned in this article that are guaranteed in
international arbitration to its own advantage or, even better, to the
detriment of opposing counsel. The themes throughout the following
discussion are not necessarily limited to international arbitration as a
dispute resolution forum. Instead, they can be applied to any right
guaranteed to a party in any dispute.
A. Reconciling Seemingly Conflicting Rights: Inherent Limits
One way to reconcile the seemingly irreconcilable rights set
forth in this article is to consider which right was exercised first, or to
consider the order of events. A related but distinct method of
reconciling the rights set forth here would be to prioritize them.83
Some argue that the most direct method to reconciling the
irreconcilable rights set forth in this article, without prioritizing one
over the other, are to draft an ethical code which will bind all parties
80

Id. at 22.

81Rompetrol, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/3, 24 ICSID Review - FILJ at 9
82 Id.

T 22.

"If the right to counsel of choice comes from a mandatory rule and the right to
exclude counsel only comes from a broad discretion such as is found in Article 19,
then the right to choose would naturally appear to dominate." Waincymer, supra
note 18, at 614.
83
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in international commercial arbitration. Perhaps through restricting
the rights themselves, abusive challenges designed to undermine the
arbitration tribunal or the proceedings would be discouraged or
prevented. 84
Thus, a good way to reconcile the conflicted rights set forth in
this Article, aside from prioritizing one or the other, is to recognize
that each has inherent limits.85 No right set forth within this Article
ought to be unlimited. Making rights unlimited only gives more
room to parties in a dispute to utilize that right as a weapon against
opposing counsel.
For example, not only can a party utilize the right to choose
counsel of its own choice to possibly taint the impartiality and
independence of an already constituted arbitration panel, a party can
also choose counsel who may not be available for a number of
years. 86 Citing its right to counsel of its choice, the offending party
can easily delay the proceedings by bullying the Tribunal into giving
it an adjournment. That adjournment would be argued for on the
basis that the party would otherwise not receive a full opportunity to
present its case through counsel of its choice.8 7
Examples of the above possibilities can be found in the cases
cited within this article. For example, in Hrvatska v. Slovenia, the
Claimant asked the Tribunal to "...recommend to the Respondent

that it refrain from using the services" of a British barrister who
belonged to the same Chambers as the President of the Tribunal.88
The barrister was added after the case began, and his involvement
was only disclosed shortly before the final hearing.8 9 By seeking a
Counsel with the same professional involvements as the Presiding
Arbitrator of a party's case, that party can easily seek an unfair
advantage over its opposing party by infiltrating the arbitration with
bias, partiality, and dependence. By utilizing these tactics to gain an

84 Id.

at 610.
609.

8 Id. at
86 Id.

87Id.

Jan Paulsson, Standards of Conduct for Counsel in InternationalArbitration, 3
AM. REV. OF INT'L ARB. 1-4 (1992); see also Bishop, supra note 1, at. 4.
88

89 Id.
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unfair advantage, however, a party subjects any award rendered by
the Tribunal to non-enforcement. 90
Just as a party can strategically use its right to choose counsel
of its choice as a tactic to advantage itself, counsel can use its rights to
fairly present its case to delay the proceedings. For example, a party
can use its right to counsel of its choice as a tactic to delay the
proceedings where counsel of its choice is beyond what is affordable;
crafty parties can then request to delay the hearing so it can save up
more money to hire the counsel of its choice. 91 Opposing counsel's
rights to challenge an award can also be used to delay the
enforcement of an award, further prolonging the litigation.

B. Reconciling Seemingly Conflicting Cases: Setting Limits on
Rights
Recognizing the danger in an inherent power to remove
counsel to cure irregularities to an arbitration tribunal, the Tribunal
in Rompetrol v. Romania was reluctant to endorse any notion of a
Tribunal's inherent power to remove counsel. 92 It further confirmed
its fear of tactical moves by parties in an arbitration by noting that
even if such a power did exist, it should only be used in rare and
compelling circumstances. 93 Hence, the reconcilability of two
seemingly irreconcilable cases lies in the dangers of the rights
guaranteed within them. Thus, one Tribunal gave a right, and
another Tribunal that dealt with very similar fact patterns ruled in
the exact opposite manner so as to set forth limits. It seems, in
essence, that the Tribunal implicitly acknowledged the argument this
article advances: that these rights were weapons that needed to be
limited. What has been argued is necessary, however, is not for
Tribunals to set forth rights, and then to limit them; instead, an
international body ought to come together to formulate a reliable and
binding ethical guideline. But is that really case?
90 See

The United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of

Foreign Arbitral Awards (1958).
91See Waincymer, supra note 18, at 609-11.
92 Rompetrol, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/3, 24 ICSID Review
- FILJ at 9 11
see also Bishop, supra note 1, at 5-6.
9
' Id.

22 25;
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VI. THE NEED FOR A BINDING ETHICAL GUIDELINE
In the end, all of these tactical procedures cost money. 94
Counselor conduct, therefore, also turns on the availability money. 95
Not only can each counsel use cost to control opposing counsel, but
arbitrators also use this weapon to control the conduct of lawyers. 96
But such a practice of using money to control counselor behavior will
target and negatively impact the parties, not counsel. 97
However, if the rights addressed by this paper are not
guaranteed, then there could be significant harm to international
arbitration as a viable dispute resolution forum. 98 If a Tribunal is
allowed to remain biased, then either counsel or arbitrator could
mistreat confidential information, inadequately prepare witnesses,
fail to consult or follow a clients' instructions, and fail to timely
respond to orders and directions. 99 On the other hand, allowing
parties to exercise the rights mentioned in this article may give
parties an additional tool to engage in disruptive and guerilla tactics.
Disallowing parties to exercise these rights, however, would quite
possibly have the same exact effect.
As Jan Paulsson has warned, "[i]n cases where counsel come
from two different countries where standards are quite inconsistent
on a given point, does the client whose lawyer is subject to the lowest
standard have an unfair advantage?"1 00 Perhaps, despite the tactical
advantages it may lend to, there is a need for a codification of ethical
standards and limitations on a party's right to choose its counsel in
international arbitration proceedings.

94

See Bishop, supra note 1, at 9; see also Waincymer, supra note 18, at 611.

95

See Bishop, supra note 1, at 9.

96 Id.

97 id.
9' See Waincymer, supra note 18, at 589-99.
99

1d
oo Paulsson, supra note 88, at 1-4; see also Bishop, supra note 1, at 2.

"CONFLICTING" RIGHTS

2013

181

A. Attempts at Ethical Guidelines
The International Bar Association'01 has published Guidelines
on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration (hereinafter "IBA
Guidelines") that, while non-binding, are widely approved and are
influential. 102 The Guidelines includes a list of common situations
which are categorized by the level of the severity of the threat they
pose to an independent and impartial tribunal. 0 3
1.

The Application of the International Bar Association's
Ethical Guidelines to Hvratska and Rompetrol

The situation in Hravtska, where the arbitrator and counsel for
one of the parties were members of the same barristers' chambers,
can be found within the "Orange List."10 4 The Orange List consists of
situations that are potentially, but not necessarily, conflicted
situations.105 The situation found in Rompetrol, where counsel had
previously been employed by an arbitrator's law firm, is not found
anywhere within the IBA Guidelines. 106 While the situation in
Hravtska was disallowed, the situation in Rompetrol was allowed. 107
This paper in no way dismisses the theory that each tribunal came to
its decision while being guided by the IBA Guidelines, even if the
cases do not cite to these guidelines as the controlling law or factors
to their decisions. Rather, this paper looks beyond the guidance set
forth within the IBA Guidelines primarily because they are not
binding. 108
101
The International Bar Association was established in 1947 and it consists of
more than 45,000 individual lawyers and over 200 bar associations and law
societies spanning all continents. http://www.ibanet.org/About the IBA/
About-the IBA.aspx.
102 See generally International Bar Association Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in
International Arbitration, 2004.
103

id.

104 Hrvatska,

ICSID Case No. ARB/05/24, 24 ICSID Review - FILJ at 201, T 4

(2009).

105Waincymer,
106 id.
107

Id.

108
Id.

supra note 18, at 599.
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B. The Necessity for a Binding Body of Law Concerning Ethics
The two conflicting cases analyzed in this paper further the
need for a governing body to come together and, in a sense, legislate
a binding ethical guideline for international arbitration. International
dispute resolution forums cannot be governed by two seemingly
conflicting cases; allowing these two cases to stand without a
governing body subsequently addressing the issues that seem to be
in conflict will simply allow parties to use both the rights they are
guaranteed in international arbitration and cases as weapons.
Between these two cases, each side to a dispute has substantive law
to support its cause. What's to help an arbitrator come to a
conclusion? 09
Disallowing specified relationships between counsel and an
arbitrator in a binding authority would prevent wasted hearing time
and prevent the need for a new or truncated tribunal. 110 It would also
increase the fairness 11 that ought to be inherent to an arbitration
proceeding by allowing parties to a proceeding to easily know what
is permissible and what is not permissible.112

C. Allowing a Challenge under an Ethical Guideline May
Actually Be a Double-Edged Sword: With the Grant of a Right
Comes the Availability of a New Tool
While this article analyzes conflicting rights guaranteed to
parties by looking at previous ICSID cases, and supports the
contentions set forth by previous scholarly work regarding the
necessity of a binding international code of ethics, there must be
something else going on here as to why there is no such thing. The
lack of a binding international code of ethics and the lack of an
109 Doak

Bishop & Margrete Stevens, The Compelling Need for a Code of Ethics
in International Arbitration: Transparency, Integrity and Legitimacy, at 4
(Available at http://www.josemigueljudice-arbitration.com/xms/files/02 TEXTOS
ARBITRAGEM/01 Doutrina ScolarsTexts/ethics/ethics
-i nt arb - icca 2010 bishop.pdf).
110See Waincymer, supra note 18, at 610.
" See Bishop & Stevens, supra note 109, at 15.
112See Waincymer, supra note 18, at 610; see also Bishop & Stevens, supra note
109, at 24.
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international governing body that reviews improper counselor
conduct, must say something beyond simply "we need a change."
The international community has fought with lit torches, preaching
the idea of going onward and forward with change, but there must
be some reason why change has not occurred. Establishing some sort
of governing body, which would apply a binding code of ethics
would at the very least, create a number of jobs that would employ
the recently unemployed. So, why not?
The "why not" is precisely wherein lies our answer. Certain
scholarly works have stuck out as sore thumbs regarding the
necessity of change. 113 But upon a closer analysis masked with
goggles of cynicism, this article will encourage the reader to ponder
what an established and binding code of ethics would do for the
world.

D. Attempts at Ethical Guidelines: Stop, in the Name of Ethics,
Before Lawyers Break a Client's Bank Account... Or, at Least
Stop in the Name of Cynicism
The scope of this article has thus far viewed the actions taken
in Rompetrol and Hrvatska as powers and rights. However, these were
not simply powers as previous scholarly work would suggest; 114 this
was either the grant of an additional legal tactic or an international
tribunal condoning the existence of a legal tactic such as challenge to
counsel, or thereby limiting the tactic. In fact, contrary to previous
findings that the reconciliation of these two seemingly conflicting
113See,

e.g., Waincymer, supra note 18; Otto L 0 de Witt Wijnen, Nathalie Voser &
Neomi Rao, Background Information on the IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest
in InternationalArbitration5 Bus. L. INT'L 433 (2004); Catherine A Rogers, Fit and
Function in Legal Ethics: Developing a Code of Conduct for International
Arbitration 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 341 (2002); Gary Born, A Code of Conduct for
Counsel in InternationalArbitration, Kluwer Arbitration Blog (Apr. 19, 2013 3:49
P.M.).
http: //kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2010/11/16/a-code-of-conduct-forcounsel-in-international-arbitration/.
114See Waincymer, supra note 18, at 605 ("The Rompetrol tribunal first considered
whether there is an inherent or implied power to control party representation; then
analyzed the scope and extent of that power; and then considered whether the
particular circumstances necessitated the exercise of such a power, were it to
exist.").
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cases was based upon balancing conflicting issues, 115 the
reconciliation may lie in an implicit acknowledgement by the tribunal
that the rights previously granted were weapons that either needed
to be taken away or dulled. While some would argue that this
acknowledgement by the Rom petrol Tribunal shows us the need for
an international code of ethics,116 it may be the Tribunal's implicit
acknowledgement that an international code of ethics may not even
help. Instead, the only way to help the situation created by Hrvatska,
should be to somehow cut back on the rights previously granted.
And while some may think the way to do this would be to have a
binding international code of ethics or an independent governing
body reviewing counselor conduct, perhaps the Tribunal in the latter
case acknowledged the inadequacy of these ideas by acting on its
own to curtail the rights granted by Hrvatska.
The relevant consideration, which is whether to have some
kind of attorney code of ethics, has been almost irrelevant to previous
case studies done on this issue.117 Previous relevant case studies have
argued that disciplining the attorney may not solve the issue because
excluding counsel would, while disciplining the attorney, also
deprive the party from their right to choose.11 8 But with the deep
pockets many clients seem to have, and the massive supply of
attorneys, perhaps excluding counsel would make no difference to a
party; the party would simply find other counsel to argue the same
or similar arguments. Perhaps Waincymer is correct in his calculation
that disciplining attorneys is not the correct solution for the problems
specifically contained in Hrvatska and Rompetrol, but not because it
would punish clients instead of attorneys. 119
Contrary to previous scholarly belief that "it is the
relationship that is subject to challenge, not the ethics or attributes of
...
Id. at 609.
116Id
1 Id. at 612 ("While there are many domestic cases which suggest that attorney

discipline should be left for judges and not arbitrators, this is not the relevant
consideration in the context of this article.")
''8 Id ("A tribunal excluding new counsel simply because of their close connection
to an existing tribunal member is not disciplining the attorney. It is simply refusing
to allow the party to have an unconstrained right to choose which would allow it to
impugn the tribunal itself.").
''9 See Waincymer, supra note 18, at 612.
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the individual," 120 it should be the ethics or attributes of the
individuals that are challenged. The actions that took place in the two
cases addressed herein were litigation tactics that were decided upon
by shrewd counsel. This is not just the relationship of counsel and
arbitrator that was in issue; it was a challenge to the actions of
counsel, which caused the questioned relationship. Contrary to what
previous scholarship have argued, the crux of the issue is not on
"party choice" or "party autonomy." 121 Respondent and Claimant,
lay persons when it comes to the law, were not the devious minds
behind the actions that took place in Hrvatska or Ronipetrol. The
actions that were at issue were counselor actions, or actions where an
attorney attempted to control or create a situation. Counsel, educated
individuals considered officers of the court, have a greater
understanding of litigation than their common layperson clients do.
They control the reigns of the litigation and the direction it will go in.
The actions in question in Hrvatska and Rom petrol were and are
decisions made by counsel, not the clients on behalf of whom they
were acting. Indeed, it is not just the relationship between arbitrator
and counsel that are in question; it is the ethics or attributes of the
attorneys involved, whether as counsel or arbitrator, that are in
question.
Thus, contrary to scholarly encouragement of the necessity of
change, perhaps there is no need for change. 122 Perhaps Waincymer is
correct in his evaluation that disciplining an attorney is not the
correct solution, but not only because it would not have helped with
the issues in Hrvatska and Rompetrol. Perhaps creating a governing
body regulating attorneys and a binding international code of ethics
would be useless for greater reasons. Perhaps there is no need for
change. Attorneys have prided themselves on getting whatever they
20

Id. at 619-22.
612.
122 See, e.g., Waincymer, supra note 18; Otto L 0 de Witt Wijnen, Nathalie Voser &
Neomi Rao, BackgroundInformation on the IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest
in InternationalArbitration 5 Bus. L. INT'L 433 (2004); Catherine A Rogers, Fit and
Function in Legal Ethics: Developing a Code of Conduct for International
Arbitration 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 341 (2002); Gary Born, A Code of Conduct for
Counsel in InternationalArbitration, Kluwer Arbitration Blog (Apr. 19, 2013 3:49
P.M.).
http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2010/11/16/a-code-of-conduct-forcounsel-in-international-arbitration/.
1

121Id. at
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want, whenever they want. Why would getting around a binding
code of ethics be any different? Previous scholarly work may be
correct in the essential need for some international code of ethics
applicable to attorneys, but perhaps there is a reason that it does not
exist. 123 Perhaps we do not want to give attorneys the opportunity to
find or create loopholes in an idealistic code of ethics. Maybe our
legal torches really do need to be put down and out.
Contrary to argument that "the better view ought to be
implied or inherent powers are sufficient for such purposes," 124
perhaps neither is enough. Perhaps we do need an explicit, express,
and binding authority, on how to take sanctions against misbehaving
counsel. Or perhaps none of that will work. Perhaps attorneys, like
shrewd chess players, will find a devious next move. Perhaps our
fear is that this devious next move may be so devious that it will turn
a seemingly honorable binding code of ethics unto itself, rendering it
worthless. And then where would we, as a legal profession, be if we
turn our ideals against and unto ourselves?
Perhaps analyzing the logistics of rules applicable to counsel
and how they would be executed is worthless because, even if were
to assume that there is a viable and working framework of a binding
code of ethics in place, the rules would still be worthless. That is just
the price of the litigation game. Attorneys will find ways to get
around the code of ethics, manufacturing new weapons at the price
of increased billable hours and clients' wallets. 125 Perhaps this cynical
view is why the author tired of litigation. Perhaps this cynical view
explains the rush that litigators experience when they come up with
devious arguments dressed in justice and fairness to circumvent their
opposing counsel's devious arguments (which also masquerade in
justice and fairness).
While "all rule systems allow for changes to be made,"
perhaps "[t]he added costs, delay and disruption would offend both

123 id.

124Waincymer, supra note 18, at
614.

Julian D.M. Lew, L.A. Mistelis and S.M. Kroll, Comparative International
CommercialArbitration(2003), n. 3 at p. 268, para. 11-37 ("Increased challenges to
arbitrators has been seen by many practitioners as at times being motivated by
tactical advantages.").
125
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fairness and efficiency principles."1 26 While previous scholars may
encourage reform, would reform even help the situation of shrewd
counsel doing whatever they can to win?127
VII. CONCLUSION

Perhaps we need to put down our blazing torches that we
have run so far with and stop chanting for a binding international
code of ethics. No ethical guideline will curtail a party from utilizing
the rights it has been guaranteed as a tactical tool to delay or trip
opposing counsel. In fact, perhaps an ethical guideline set forth by a
legislative body will allow a party to have even more tactics than
those set forth in Hrvatska and Rompetrol to delay the tribunal or
invalidate an opposing counsel's legitimate arguments.
Thus, perhaps there is no need for change. Perhaps we need
to stop arguing for change. Perhaps a binding code of ethics would
be worthless. Perhaps the only worth of a binding code of ethics
would be to create more work for attorneys in an attempt to get
around each rule, thereby creating even more devious tactics. The
legal field may applaud the creation of work, and in turn the creation
of more billable hours, but our clients may not be so happy with us.
Or, at least, their bank accounts should not be.
Even a seemingly benign rule such as the requirement to
notice opposing counsel of one's motion within a specified number of
days can be used to invalidate opposing counsel's un-noticed motion
and, in turn, what could have been a viable or winning argument.
But who will accuse a counsel of tactical delay or taking advantage of
the rules when they are allegedly fighting against abuse of the
system's fair time limits? Perhaps this is cynicism, or perhaps it is just
sheer exhaustion on the part of the author with the field of litigation.
But isn't cynicism a form of sanity?

Waincymer, supra note 18, at 622.
Id at 623 ("[R]eforms in that arena should confirm the rights espoused here and
address the mismatch between determinative bodies that would arise under some lex
arbitri."); see Otto L 0 de Witt Wijnen, Nathalie Voser & Neomi Rao, Background
126
127

Information on the IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International
Arbitration,5 Bus. L. INT'L 433 (2004).

